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There are many different meanings of sustainability and precaution and no
evident connection between the new normative concepts and the traditional moral
theories. We seek an ethical basis for sustainability and precaution—a common
framework that can serve as a means of resolving the conceptual ambiguities of
the new normative concepts and the conflicts between new and traditional moral
concepts and theories. We employ a systemic approach to analyze the past and
possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclusive framework of ethical
extension. This framework forms the basis for what we call a systemic ethic.
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I. THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABILITY AND PRECAUTION
There is an increasing focus on environmental and global issues in society
and this focus is reflected in the widespread use of concepts such as sustain-
ability and the precautionary principle. But what is the normative force of these
concepts? The environmental issues have not been systematically addressed by
philosophers until the last few decades.1 And the new normative concepts still
pose a challenge to ethical theory.
The present paper originates in considerations on sustainability and precaution
in agricultural research—in particular with regard to organic agriculture, which
demonstrates an alternative agricultural practice and opens up for new perspec-
tives on nature. The scope of the paper is, however, not restricted to agriculture.
Environmental problems in agriculture involve complex ecological and bio-
physical processes, as well as human actors, their practices and preferences,
and the workings of social systems. Agriculture depends on natural processes
that can only to some degree be controlled by humans—in spite of a rapid
technological development. In these, and in many other ways, agriculture can
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be taken as a fertile example for understanding the moral aspects of environ-
mental issues in general.
There is, however, no single, well-defined meaning of either sustainability
or precaution. The diversity of meanings of sustainability can be analyzed in
relation to different perceptions of nature. It is common to distinguish between
different “myths of nature,” where nature is seen as robust or vulnerable in
terms of ecological resilience.2 This diversity is related to the distinction
between weak and strong sustainability in environmental economics.3 Strong
sustainability builds on two assumptions: that nature is (more or less) vulner-
able and that society is dependent on nature in terms of basic life support
services. As a result, it holds that man-made and natural capital cannot be
infinitely substituted. Weak sustainability assumes that they can, and it is
therefore essentially an economic concept that has no separate normative
content.
Agriculture brings in a new perspective on sustainability that has to do with
the relationship between humans and nature. Gordon Douglass has described
three different meanings of agricultural sustainability that are used by different
groups with different views and values.4 Conventional agriculture mainly
speaks of sustainability in the sense of food sufficiency—sufficient food
production in relation to future needs. Agriculture is seen as an instrument for
feeding the world based on resource use, technological development, and
economic cost-benefit analysis. Sustainability as stewardship is concerned
with the ecological balance and the biophysical limits to agricultural produc-
tion, and therefore determines desirable population levels. In alternative forms
of agriculture, including organic farming, sustainability is mainly understood
as community. They share the concern for ecological balance, but with a focus
on the permanence and self-reliance of the agricultural system and on the social
organization and cultural values of rural life.
On this background, we can distinguish between two different kinds of
conceptions of the human relationship to nature. A separative kind that sees
humans as basically separate from nature, and a systemic kind that sees humans
as basically an integral part of nature. This distinction leads to three different
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views of nature. Within the separative conception of nature there are two
opposite perspectives on the value of nature. In the culturist view of nature the
controlled, well-ordered and cultivated nature is the good nature, while the
naturalist view of nature values the wild, authentic and uncontrolled nature—
nature untouched by man. The systemic perspective on nature can be charac-
terized as an ecologist view of nature, which values the intimate and mutually
benign relations between human and nature. (These generic terms do, of course,
not preclude that an ecologist may have a naturalist view, etc.)
This threefold distinction can be used to identify the underlying views of
evaluative and normative concepts that refer to nature and the environment,
such as nature quality and sustainability. For instance, Douglass’ food suffi-
ciency takes a culturist view of nature, stewardship a naturalist view, and
community an ecologist view. Another example is the distinction between two
schools in the philosophy of nature conservation, compositionalism and func-
tionalism,5 which correspond to the naturalist and the ecologist view respec-
tively.
Paul Thompson suggests a philosophical distinction between two approaches
to agricultural sustainability.6 Resource sufficiency, which corresponds to
Douglass’ food sufficiency, is an “accounting” approach that presumes the ability
to measure and calculate the proper balance between present resource use and
future needs in line with the discussion of strong and weak sustainability
referred to above. Functional integrity presupposes the idea of a system having
crucial elements, such as soil, crops, livestock, ecosystems, cultural values,
and social institutions, that may be reproduced over time in a way that depends
upon previous system states.
Thompson points out that ignorance is handled differently in the two ap-
proaches. Resource sufficiency is concerned with making predictions on the
basis of available knowledge. Functional integrity emphasizes resilience based
on a recognition of the limits of human knowledge. This difference forms a
junction with the concept of precaution.
There are different approaches to precaution in society, based on different
conceptions of human knowledge and control, which involve different ways of
handling uncertainty and ignorance.7 Conventional rational decision making
involves risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses that support acting in
proportion to the calculated risks or, more generally, the expected utility. This
approach can be called “rational precaution” (in the same sense as “rational
251  PM 6.0 12/22/02, 7:26 PM61
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS62 Vol. 24
8 See, e.g., Tim. O’Riordan and James Cameron, eds., Interpreting the Precautionary Principle
(London: Earthscan, 1994); Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner, eds., Protecting Public
Health and the Environment. Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Washington, D.C.:
Island Press, 2000).
9 This interpretation of the precautionary principle is based on Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen,
“The Precautionary Principle in Germany: Enabling Government,” in O’Riordan and Cameron,
Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, p. 37.
10 See also the discussion of sustainability as a system-describing and a goal-prescribing
(normative) concept in Paul. B. Thompson, “The Varieties of Sustainability,” Agriculture and
Human Values 9 (1992): 11–19.
choice theory”). It is based on the available scientific knowledge and ignores
ignorance—ignorance with regard to causal consequences and the values and
preferences of those who might be affected. A different approach, known as the
precautionary principle, has emerged in the context of environmental law.8
This approach can be called “reflexive precaution.” It involves reflections on
the limits of scientific knowledge and control, and deliberate strategies for
handling ignorance and uncertainty. According to the precautionary principle,
the responsibility toward future as well as present generations obliges us to
preserve the natural basis of life and avoid irreversible changes with unforesee-
able consequences. The principle requires that preventive action be taken (e.g.,
by saying no to unpredictable technological activities) when there is a possi-
bility of severe or irreversible damage to the environment. In other words,
decisions makers must act in advance of conclusive scientific evidence of the
danger. This strategy is supplemented with the development of society’s capac-
ity for early detection of dangers through comprehensive research, and the
development and promotion of cleaner technologies.9
In the present paper we seek an ethical basis for sustainability and precau-
tion.10 A common framework that can serve as a means of resolving the
conceptual ambiguities in the practical use of the new normative concepts and
as a means of resolving conflicts between new and traditional moral concepts
and theories. The method that is employed here is to analyze the past and
possible future extension of ethics and establish an inclusive framework of
ethical extension. The extension of ethics has been driven by the increased
awareness of, for instance, the similarities and relations between human and
other living beings and the growing human influence on natural systems and
processes, and by the increased human potential for acting morally in keeping
with this awareness. In accordance with this awareness, the analysis is charac-
terized by a systemic approach based on a systemic conception of nature, and the
established framework forms the basis for what we call a systemic ethic.
There is a traditional distinction between non-consequentialist ethics, which
focus on the intention or motivation behind the act (such as character, virtues,
duties), and consequentialist ethics, which focus on the consequences of the act
(such as utility). The distinction can be illustrated by a simple model of moral
acting:
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(moral agent) intentions → acts → consequences (moral object)
We need to go beyond this distinction to understand sustainability and precau-
tion, because both these traditions are insufficient in front of the rapid techno-
logical development and the limited knowledge of the consequences of new
technology. In particular, there is a need to go beyond the individualism and
rationalism of classical humanist and utilitarian ethics,11 towards an ethic that
incorporates the present understanding of social and ecological systems and
which emphasizes responsible acting rather than intentions or consequences.
II. THE EXTENSION OF MORAL CONSIDERABILITY
The historical roots of ethics are found in the relations between the indi-
vidual and the members of the local community. Ethics concerned the direct
dealing of man with man, including the dealing with himself. From today’s
viewpoint, history shows an extension of ethics from the consideration for
one’s fellows towards the inclusion of equal men, slaves, women, and, more
recently, all human beings, future people, and sentient beings. In order to fully
analyze this past extension of ethics and the possible future extension, we need
to look at the different aspects of ethical acting in some detail and discriminate
between different dimensions of the extension.
In the history of Western culture, ethics was mostly anthropocentric and
symmetrical. Those who were taken into ethical consideration were themselves
capable of moral action. This symmetry is expressed in the so-called golden
rule of ethics (here from the gospel of Matthew): “In everything, do to others
what you would have them do to you.” In the very influential ethics of
Immanuel Kant, there is also a symmetrical foundation, expressed in his well-
known single categorical imperative of morality: “Act only on that maxim
which you can at the same time will, that it should become a universal law.”12
A universal symmetrical ethics such as Kant’s, entailing that all those capable
of moral action, and only those, are worthy of moral consideration, can provide
a rationale for an extension of ethics beyond one’s fellows, but it also precludes
the extension of moral considerability beyond persons (rational beings) to, for
instance, young children and mentally disabled humans. Hence, the humanitar-
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ian movement in itself entailed an extension beyond the symmetrical ethics,
because it included consideration for all humans.13
This extension necessitates the distinction between moral responsibility,
concerning the moral agent, and moral considerability, concerning the object
of moral consideration. It leaves open the possible extension of moral consider-
ability to those incapable of moral action. It also allows for a separate inquiry
into the space of moral responsibility (see further in section 5).
There are different approaches and arguments to the question of where the
limit of moral considerability is to be drawn. The history of ethics shows some
exceptions to the dominance of anthropocentric ethics, such as the Epicureans
who took the good to be pleasure and recognized that animals as well as humans
were capable of feeling pleasure and pain.14 In most cases, however, the
concern for animals was based on concern for the ensuing effects on human
morals. Explicit ethical concerns for higher animals were raised in the late
eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century, for example in the utilitarian
ethics of Jeremy Bentham, but only in the 1970s did animal rights become a
serious and much debated philosophical subject.15
Environmental ethics has been concerned with the further extension of moral
considerability, to living beings in general, ecosystems or “Nature.”16 Many
different kinds of ethics may entail an environmental ethic in the sense of “a
concern for the human environment.” William K. Frankena lists eight different
“ethics about the environment” with different spheres of considerability,
arguing that each can entail an environmental ethic.17 The first five are
characterized by still wider spheres, the limits being: (1) oneself, (2) humans
or persons, (3) sentient beings, (4) living beings, (5) everything. Type 6
includes only God as a moral object, type 7 includes God and one of the first
five types, and type 8 includes only nature. These environmental ethics will, as
Frankena readily admits, be different, and he casts his vote on an ethics where
only sentient beings are morally considerable, leaving the rest of the environ-
ment to be considered as values in relation to humans and sentient beings.
Frankena’s point is that we may very well decide to protect the environment
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because it is of value to us, while not acknowledging any moral consideration
for non-sentient beings. (The relation between value and moral value is
discussed further in section 7.)
Type 8 in Frankena’s list of ethics is ambiguous as to whether nature is to be
left alone (the naturalist view of nature) or to be cooperated with, followed and
imitated (the ecologist view). It is therefore not very helpful as a moral guideline.
The other seven ethics focus on individuals, and the moral considerability of
ecological systems comes in only as an appendix to the considerability of
“everything” (type 5). Since the considerability of “everything” is next to a
reductio ad absurdum of the idea of an extension of moral considerability,
Frankena’s structuring of environmental ethics is not favorable to the idea that
ecosystems might deserve moral consideration. Views of moral considerability
that focus solely on individuals cannot form a sufficient basis for a systemic
normative concept, such as the functional integrity conception of sustainability.
Kenneth Goodpaster has argued that the two major foundational accounts of
morality of the modern period—the “Humean” family of utilitarian ethics in
which moral predicates are derived from the interests of individuals, and the
“Kantian” family where ethical imperatives are derived from the rational
generalization of the intrinsic worth of individual beings—share a basic
“individualistic” model of moral sentiment or reason.18 Goodpaster further
states that when the individualistic model is the only model available, “its
implausibilities will keep us from dealing ethically with environmental obli-
gations or ideals altogether.” He urges that we, in a sense, “return to the richer
Greek conception of a man by nature social . . . —though it goes beyond the
Greek conception in emphasizing that societies too need to be understood in a
context, an ecological context, and that it is this larger whole which is the
‘bearer of value.’” 19
III. INDIVIDUALISTIC AND SYSTEMIC
APPROACHES TO MORAL CONSIDERABILITY
Two perspectives on the extension of ethics are of particular interest in
relation to sustainability, because they involve a systemic approach to ethics.
They are the ecological and the technological perspective, represented here by
Aldo Leopold and Hans Jonas respectively. Leopold took ethics to be a body
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of self-imposed limitations on freedom of action, based on the recognition that
the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. In “The
Land Ethic” he described the historical extension of ethics from tribal members
to men from other tribes and races, and to slaves and women, and argued for
a further extension to the “biotic community”:
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The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils,
waters, plants and animals, or collectively: the land. . . . The extension of ethics
to this . . . element in human environments is, if I read the evidence correctly, an
evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.20
While Leopold is regarded as the most important source of modern biocentric
or holistic ethics,21 there were important precursors to his evolutionary account
of ethics, such as William E. H. Lecky and Charles Darwin.22 Darwin wrote on
the social nature of ethics in “The Descent of Man”:
Finally the social instincts, which no doubt were acquired by man as by the lower
animals for the good of the community, will from the first have given to him some
wish to aid his fellows, some feeling of sympathy, and have compelled him to
regard their approbation and disapprobation. Such impulses will have served him
at a very early period as a rude rule of right and wrong. But as man gradually
advanced in intellectual power, and was enabled to trace the more remote
consequences of his actions . . . [and as] his sympathies became more tender and
widely diffused, extending to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other
useless members of society, and finally to the lower animals,—so would the
standard of his morality rise higher and higher.23
But still, Leopold’s “biotic community” was a radical, novel conception in
ethics, because it took a distinctly systemic perspective on man as part of
nature, spurred by ecological science. As J. Baird Callicott succinctly states it:
“. . . ecology changes our values by changing our concepts of the world and of
ourselves in relation to the world.”24
Darwin’s mention of the ability to “trace the more remote consequences of
actions” points toward the other systemic approach, the ethics of technology.
In the traditional ethics the right way of acting was determined from the
immediate consequences, and far and future effects were left to the workings
of chance, fate or providence. No one was held responsible for the unintended
long-term effects of his or her well-intentioned, well-considered and well-
performed acts.25 Today, the traditional ethics of face-to-face encounters is
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insufficient due to the range of consequences and the magnitude of risks
associated with the technological development.
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Modern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and conse-
quences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them. . . . No
previous ethics had to consider the global condition of human life and the far-off
future, even existence, of the race.26
According to Jonas, the expansion of human power through the collective
practice of technology has created an ethical vacuum, and “novel powers to act
require novel ethical rules and perhaps even a new ethics.”27 Jonas summarizes
the new duties that correspond to our new powers in his theory of responsibil-
ity—responsibility is a correlate of power.28
The expansion of the range and impact of our collective actions and our
increased awareness of possible far and future consequences moves the principle
of responsibility into the very center of ethics. But before continuing the
analysis of responsible acting (in section 5), we first investigate the systemic
approach to moral considerability in more detail.
Callicott made a sharp distinction between the animal liberation movement
and an environmental ethics in the tradition of Leopold’s land ethic.29 The
extension of ethics to sentient animals in the animal rights movement is
individualistic, in the same way as traditional humanism, while the Leopoldian
environmental ethics is holistic, locating ultimate value in the biotic commu-
nity: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise.”30
In line with Goodpaster and Callicott we distinguish between two different
paths of extension of moral considerability: an individualistic extension in
kind and a systemic community extension. The individualistic considerability
can be extended in the familiar way from the individual moral agent to others
of—more or less—the same kind: fellows, persons, human beings, sentient
beings, living beings, and things. The possible systemic extension moves along
a different path: from individual to family (perhaps including family animals,
such as hunting dogs, horses, livestock, or pets), and further to the local and the
global biotic or ecological community (the land and the humans, animals,
plants, and other beings living on the land), and the universe. Sustainability as
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on the process of identification and the extension of the self.
functional integrity can be seen as a moral principle that is based on such an
extension of systemic moral considerability.
While this distinction between an individualistic and a systemic path of
extension of moral considerability is in line with recent trends in ethics, some
justification is needed as to why this distinction is more than a contingent one.
Goodpaster framed the central problem of modern ethics as the problem of
overcoming egoism.31 The justification provided here is based on there being
two separate ways of “overcoming egoism” in line with the eighteenth-century
discussion of moral sense, which distinguished between “enlightened self-
interest” and “disinterested benevolence.” The two ways of overcoming egoism
are ways of “extending the self”: an (individualistic) extension by way of iden-
tification with other individual selves and a (systemic) extension by way of
expanding the boundary of ones own self.
IV. TWO WAYS OF “EXTENDING THE SELF”
In his social theory of the self, George Mead has described the “I” and the
“me” as different aspects of the self (that is, the self seen from different
perspectives) in the process of self-consciousness.32 The “I” is the actor as well
as, but not at the same time as, the observer of the “me.” Or in other terms, the
“me” is the self as an object—that which is presented to the “I” as self. This
view is based on a social conception of self, where the self that consciously
stands over against other selves thereby becomes an object, an other to him or
herself.33 Mead’s theory of the social self lends itself directly to the individu-
alistic path of extension of moral considerability, since self-awareness entails
the ability to see oneself as another by way of taking another’s point of view
on oneself and one’s actions and, hence (by inference from this knowledge of
oneself as object and subject to the subjects of similar objects), an ability to see
others as oneself—as autonomous subjects with interests more or less like
oneself. In other words, the individualistic moral considerability is based on
identifying with the other as an “I” in certain respects.34
The rational acknowledgement that another is a subject with interests like
oneself forms a basis for identifying with the other and thus for feelings of
sympathy, empathy, or love—this is the way of “disinterested benevolence.”
Jonas says that “it is indeed of the essence of our moral nature that the appeal,
as insight transmits it, finds an answer in our feeling. It is the feeling of
responsibility.” He continues:
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. . . ethics has an objective side and a subjective side, the one having to do with
reason, the other with emotion. . . . the two sides are mutually complementary and
both are integral to ethics itself. Without our being, at least by disposition,
responsive to the call of duty in terms of feeling, the most cogent demonstration
of this right, even when compelling theoretical assent, would be powerless to
make it a motivating force.35
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The systemic expansion of the self rests on the perception of “the other” as
being, in a certain respect, part of oneself—included in an expanded ecological
or relationary perception of self. In an ecological understanding of humans as
part of nature, the self is a center of organization, with Paul Shepard’s term,
constantly drawing on and influencing the surroundings, and there is no sharp
boundary between self and not self. In the words of Alan Watts, inspired by
Eastern philosophy: “The world is your body.”36 Callicott quotes Holmes
Rolston’s meditations on a lake shore:
The waters of North Inlet are part of my circulatory system; and the more literally
we take this truth the more nearly we understand it. I incarnate the solar energies
that flow through this lake. No one is free-living. . . . Bios [life] is intrinsically
symbiosis.37
Callicott continues:
As one moves, in imagination, outwardly from the core of one’s organism, it is
impossible to find a clear demarcation between oneself and one’s environment.
. . . Ecology, thus, gives a new meaning as well as new substance to the phrase
“enlightened self-interest.”38
In Mead’s terms, this movement can be seen as based on an expansion of
“me”—of the moral agent’s representation of “myself” as an object. We can
thus consider the local community and the wider ecological system as part of
an expanded “me.” The rational acknowledgement that “the other” is part of an
expanded “me” forms a basis for identifying (in a different sense from above)
with the larger system and thus for feelings of self-love—and this is the way
of “enlightened self-interest.”
The two ways of extending the self forms a foundation for extending moral
considerability along two different paths, an individualistic and a systemic.
The two perspectives may also be combined so that the moral consideration for
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University Press, 1995), pp. 5–11. The model corresponds to the general model of a cognitive
system that is presented in H. F. Alrøe, “Science as Systems Learning: Some Reflections on the
Cognitive and Communicational Aspects of Science,” Cybernetics and Human Knowing 7, no.
4 (2000): 57–78.
an individual includes the systemic consideration based on that subject’s
perspective.
V. TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR ETHICAL EXTENSION
Above we have distinguished between moral responsibility and moral consider-
ability, and discussed the individualistic and systemic ways of extending moral
considerability. This account is, however, not a sufficient framework for dis-
cussing the normative aspects of sustainability and precaution. In Jonas’ theory
of moral responsibility the extension of ethics is linked to the expansion of the
range of our technological actions and of our knowledge of far and future
consequences—uncertain as it is.39 Taking responsible acting as the basis for
the analysis of the extension of ethics (instead of moral considerability) calls
for a broader ethical framework. In this light, it is evident that we need to
distinguish further dimensions of moral extension, apart from responsibility
and considerability, in order to establish an inclusive systemic framework for
ethics. But it is not clear exactly what constitutes those dimensions.
In order to determine the relevant dimensions in which an extension of ethics
may take place, we need to elaborate on the simple model of moral acting
presented in section 1. The new model, shown in figure 1, is a second-order
cybernetic model of moral acting.40 Based on this model, four dimensions of
ethical extension can be identified (shown in figure 2). The four dimensions
correspond to four elements of the model of moral acting in figure 1: the moral
agent, the moral object, the acts and consequences, and the grounds of action
(intentions, observation, and self-observation).
The dimension of moral considerability, which refers to the moral object, has
already been discussed in some detail above. The dimension of moral responsi-
bility refers to the moral agent. It is therefore constrained to self-aware beings
and cannot be extended in the way of considerability (to sentient beings, for
instance). Accordingly, moral responsibility has traditionally been understood
as individual or personal responsibility. But the growing complexity of human
society and the dramatic development of collective technological action
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abilities give reasons for considering human societies, organizations, and corpo-
rations as moral agents.41 In accordance with such a view, we can speak of the
Fig. 1. Second order cybernetic model of moral acting.
Fig. 2. Framework for ethical extension.
41 Hans Lenk, “Distributability Problems and Challenges to the Future Resolutions of Respon-
sibility Conflicts,” Society for Philosophy and Technology 3, no. 4 (1998): 69–93; Sytse Strijbos,
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“Ethics and the Systemic Character of Modern Technology,” Society for Philosophy and Technol-
ogy 3, no. 4 (1998): 19–34.
42 Holmes Rolston, III, Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988),
p. 247; Hans Lenk, “Progress, Values and Responsibility,” Society for Philosophy and Technol-
ogy 2, nos. 3–4 (1997): 102–19, p. 107.
43 Strijbos, “Ethics and the Systemic Character,” p. 28, in a discussion of Jonas’ ethics of
technology.
44 Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility. Lenk, “Progress, Values and Responsibility,” p.
108: “In proportion to its powers, technologically multiplied to an extreme, humankind’s
responsibilities have grown if not exploded.”
45 Strijbos, “Ethics and the Systemic Character,” p. 19.
collective social responsibility of such social systems—and of the demand for
developing social systems that can take on a global responsibility.42 In this
vein, Sytse Strijbos asks: “What societal agents are responsible for particular
developments? How are the different responsibilities of the agents related to
each other and how are they coordinated?” and suggests that “what can be of
help here is a systems view of technology that clarifies the interweavement
between human actions at the various systems levels and the responsibilities
that belong to a variety of agents at these levels.”43
The third dimension, action ability, refers to the types of acts and conse-
quences that the agent has the power to initiate. In line with Jonas, the polluter
pays principle from environmental policy can be seen as a moral principle that
is based on the ethical dimensions of human action ability and moral respon-
sibility. Action ability may be individual, cumulative (involving more of the
same kind of individual actions, such as in an increase of the human population
size), or technological—that is, involving new kinds of human action.44 For
instance, the so-called “tragedy of the commons” is a moral aspect of the
cumulative consequences of individually harmless actions. On the other hand,
the technological development in agriculture, for instance, in terms of ma-
chines, chemical engineering, biotechnology, and genetic engineering intro-
duces entirely new kinds of human action into the world. Technological actions
are essentially collective actions of social systems. In the words of Strijbos:
“Technology is no longer simply a matter of objects in the hands of individuals;
it has become a very complex system in which our everyday lives are
embedded. The systemic character of modern technology confronts us with
relatively new questions and dimensions of human responsibility.” 45
The fourth dimension, moral grounds of action, concerns the type of grounds
that the agent employs in moral acts. The primary grounds of action are always
intentions, broadly construed as including the representation of the object, the
motivations of the agent, and moral principles of acting. The intentions are
non-cybernetic (0. order, see figure 1). That is, there is no “feedback” to the
moral agent. The intentions can be altered if the known consequences and
impacts, which are exposed by (1. order) observations, are included as moral
grounds of action. Moreover, the unknown consequences and impacts can be
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46 See also Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), p. 132, where he proposes an extended principle of accountability,
according to which somebody is morally responsible not only for intentional acts, but also for
unintended effects, which they should have known.
included as a third type of moral grounds of action, based on the
acknowledgement of the limits of observation and knowledge that are revealed
by (2. order) self-observation or self-reflexivity. Including unknown consequences
diminishes the moral importance of the known consequences, and therefore
increases the importance of intentions and principles of moral acting, but it also
provides a new basis for critical reflection on the intentions and principles of
acting.46
The inclusion of ignorance and uncertainty as a moral ground of action
combined with the growing action ability has many implications. The (“re-
straining”) responsibility for preventing possible unwanted consequences is
one implication—as exemplified in the use of the principle of precaution in
environmental policy. It also plays an important role in understanding the
different ways that the concept of sustainability is used, as evident in the
previously mentioned distinction between resource sufficiency and functional
integrity. Another implication concerns the (“intervening”) responsibility to
utilize the new action abilities to help and protect those in need. Here the limits
of knowledge and control caution against active interference where the conse-
quences of the intervention cannot be foreseen. With reference to the model of
moral acting in figure 1, it is clear that the impacts on the object of moral
consideration are even harder to observe than the consequences of ones acts,
because the impacts depend on the interests, well-being, or integrity of the
moral objects. And these cannot be fully known from outside. With respect to
human welfare this problem can to some degree be circumvented by way of
linguistic communication. But for other kinds of moral objects we are left with
the knowledge of our ignorance as a moral ground of action.
We use the term systemic ethic to designate an ethical stance that includes all
the systemic aspects of ethical extension in the framework—systemic
considerability, social responsibility, technological action ability, and and the limits of
knowledge as a moral ground of action. Some of the implications and pertinent
questions of a systemic ethic will be discussed briefly in the last sections,
including a discussion of the relation to some more familiar concepts within




In environmental ethics the extension of ethics is often discussed in terms of
anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism. The traditional anthropocentric
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47 Note the connection between some ecocentric views and the naturalist view of nature in
section 1.
48 E.g., Ferré, “Persons in Nature,” and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, “Individualism, Holism and
Environmental Ethics,” Ethics and the Environment 1, no. 1 (1996): 55–69; p. 63.
49 Goodpaster, “On Being Morally Considerable,” pp. 311–12.
50 Singer, “Not for Humans Only,” pp. 194–95.
view is a position within an individualistic, humanistic ethics, and nonanthro-
pocentric views indicate an extension of moral considerability beyond the
limits of anthropocentrism (it is, however, often not made clear whether the
limit of considerability is drawn at persons, in a symmetrical ethics, or at
humans, even though these two positions are philosophically very different).
Nonanthropocentric is the general term for an extension beyond persons or
humans, and there are a number of more specific concepts such as pathocentric
(from pathos: suffering, experience, emotion), biocentric, and ecocentric.
Pathocentric and biocentric correspond to including, respectively, sentient
beings (leaving the definition of sentient being as a subject for further
discussion) and living beings into moral considerability. Ecocentric, on the
other hand, is not nonanthropocentric in the sense of extending individualistic
considerability. It involves the extension of systemic considerability. Hence,
even though the nonanthropocentric concepts are apt and widespread in use,
the distinction between individualistic and systemic considerability as two
different ways of extending moral considerability, allows for more precise
indications of ethical positions and thus for more clarity in the theoretical
discussions.
Furthermore, the nonanthropocentric terms tend to conflate the issues of
extension and equity, because the suffix centric implies not only an extension
of considerability but also a shift of moral significance. Pathocentric, for instance,
indicates that pigs and persons are of equal moral significance. Ecocentric
indicates the primacy of ecological systems or Nature over individuals.47 This
implicit shift of moral significance is rightfully criticized for justifying acts
that are inhumane in the sense of being unjust to persons.48 As Goodpaster
suggests, we need to distinguish between moral considerability and moral
significance.49 Moral considerability deals with the extensional aspect of
equity (what kinds of moral objects enter into our considerations of equity?)
while moral significance deals with the justice aspect (what does equity
between these objects mean?). Extending moral considerability does not imply
any position on moral significance—apart from the obvious that the extension
of considerability determines the sphere within which we can discuss moral
significance.
According to Singer, species membership is not a relevant reason for treating
nonhumans different from humans.50 His concept of “animal liberation” points
out the analogy between the unjust, unequal treatment of slaves, of women, and
of animals on farms and labs. But even though all sentient beings, for instance,
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51 See Donald VanDeVeer, “Interspecific Justice and Intrinsic Value,” The Electronic Journal
of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1995): 7, for a more detailed discussion of just differential treatment
in relation to intrinsic value.
52 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. W. D. Ross, bk. 5, sec. 3.
53 See, e.g., Rolston, Environmental Ethics, pp. 223–24.
54 See Johnson, A Morally Deep World, for an elaboration of such a view, and critiques by e.g.,
Robin Attfield, Value, Obligation and Meta-Ethics (Amsterdam: Edition Rodopi, 1995), p. 24,
and Shrader-Frechette, “Individualism, Holism,” p. 59.
55 Note, however, that the systemic extension involves going beyond the “instrumental” view
of the system. In this context, the limits of knowledge need to be taken into consideration when
evaluating moral significance. An instrumental view of the system can be found in both
anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric individualistic ethics, see, e.g., Bryan G. Norton, “Episte-
mology and Environmental Values,” The Monist 75, no. 2 (1992): 208–26, and Taylor, Respect
for Nature. See also Norton’s convergence hypothesis (p. 209), which states the equivalence of
nonanthropocentric and anthropocentric positions.
are considered morally considerable, sentient and self-aware beings need not
be considered of equal moral significance. Treating pigs and persons alike
must be judged unjust if self-awareness is included as being of moral rel-
evance, because equity then means treating persons differently from sentient
beings without self-awareness.51 Justice in the Aristotelian sense means
proportional treatment where like instances are treated alike52—the crucial
question is which similarities and differences are considered relevant.
In order to distinguish the just from the unjust differences, we suggest some
guidelines for the relevance of differences in moral significance. Equity, in the
present framework, is associated with either individualistic or systemic sig-
nificance. Individualistic significance involves empirical questions concern-
ing general differences between kinds of beings (sometimes discussed in the
form of levels of being53). The relevance of a difference depends on whether
it is related to the individuals well-being, sense-ability, or level of awareness.
In the systemic perspective, it is difficult to speak of the well-being of ecosys-
tems, for instance, since there seems to be limited empirical support for an
organismic view of ecosystems.54 Instead, systemic significance involves em-
pirical questions concerning the relative functional importance of different
processes of social and ecological dynamics (often discussed in terms of sustainabil-
ity). The relevance of a difference in systemic significance depends on whether
it is related to the functional integrity of the system—that is, the structure of
relations, processes, and “memory structures” that sustains the system.55
Some kinds of living beings and physical processes, which we consider of
little or no individual moral significance, are of great systemic moral signifi-
cance with regard to the functional integrity of the ecological community. Any
single individual, or group of individuals, has very limited systemic signifi-
cance, unless they are the bearers of a functional role in the system and
therefore play a key role in sustaining the system or a subsystem. In this way
the significance of, for instance, the remaining individuals of a threatened
species can increase.
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Western Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 102.
59 See H. F. Alrøe and E. S. Kristensen, “Towards a Systemic Research Methodology in
Agriculture: Rethinking the Role of Values in Science,” Agriculture and Human Values 19, no.
1 (2002): 3-23, for a detailed discussion of objectivity, contextuality and values in science.
60 O’Neill, “The Varieties,” pp. 119–20.
VII. DISCUSSION OF THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF NATURE
It is a widely held idea that a “proper” environmental ethics must be based
on nature having intrinsic value (as opposed to nature being only of instrumen-
tal value to humans), because such value would be a necessary and sufficient
ground for human obligations to nonhuman nature.56 A common line of
argument is to establish this necessary connection by way of defending the
existence of objective intrinsic values in nature.57 This argument, however,
presupposes that intrinsic values have moral import—and this question is
impeded by the many senses of intrinsic value. In other words, a key problem
with the language of values and intrinsic values is that it tends to confuse
questions of value and ethics. In this paper, we have treated the moral
considerability of nature without reference to intrinsic value. From this basis
the question of the moral import of intrinsic value in its different senses can be
addressed and the implications for value theory drawn out.
The systemic ethic takes a relational view of values in line with the relational
ontology that is entailed in a systemic conception of nature. According to H.
Richard Niebuhr a relational value theory “is objective in the sense that value
relations are understood to be independent of the feelings of an observer but not
in the sense that value is itself an objective kind of reality.”58 Niebuhr shows
how relational value-thinking can be found implicit in both objectivist and
subjectivist positions, and how the dichotomy thus masks a common relationary
ground. Relational value theory is relativistic (in the sense known from
physics), or contextual, and therefore incompatible with the idea of an ideal
observer, but not with the idea of objective methods of research with due
attendance to the viewpoint of the observer and to the interplay of facts and
values.59 On this basis, a certain structure can be impressed on the concepts of
intrinsic value as indicated in the brief discussion below.
John O’Neill distinguishes between three different basic senses of intrinsic
value: intrinsic value1 meaning noninstrumental value, intrinsic value2 mean-
ing the value of an object in virtue of its non-relational properties (as employed
by G. E. Moore), and intrinsic value3 meaning “objective value,” which an
object possesses independently of the valuations of valuers.60 Tom Regan
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63 See also Judith N. Scoville, “Value Theory and Ecology in Environmental Ethics: A Comparison
of Rolston and Niebuhr,” Environmental Ethics 17 (1995): 115–33; p. 122, for a discussion, based
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gives a different threefold distinction in which intrinsic value is understood as
either a mental state, a state of affairs, or an end in itself.61 O’Neill’s intrinsic
value1 conflates Regan’s end in itself and mental state—there are two kinds of
opposites to instrumental value: intrinsic value (Reagan’s end in itself) and
immediate value. Immediate value includes Regan’s mental state (experiential
value) as well as, for example, physiological value, and it is in opposition to
mediate or instrumental values, such as contributive (part), productive (tool)
and substitutive (exchange, market) values. Regan’s state-of-affairs corre-
sponds to O’Neill’s intrinsic value2, but value in this non-relational sense has
no place in a relational view of values. O’Neill’s intrinsic value3, objective
values, must either pertain to a value relation, in which case the term intrinsic
value seems inappropriate (because the “objectivity” of a value relation does
not in itself imply moral import), or to a non-relational value, in which case it
must be discarded here together with intrinsic value2.
Of the senses treated above, only the intrinsic value of an individual being
as an end in itself has direct moral import, given that it corresponds to individu-
alistic moral considerability. When using the language of values in ethics, we
need to distinguish between moral values, or second order values, such as the
intrinsic value of a person, and first order values, such as the experiential and
instrumental values that the person “has.” It is not values as such that are
considerable in ethics, but the other individual or the larger community.62 The
importance of this distinction only becomes evident when the limits of
knowledge are taken into account. When there is limited knowledge of the
values that some moral object “has,” the moral considerability for that object
implies a cautious and conservative attitude towards encroaching on the object.
Analogous to the individualistic intrinsic values of individual beings, we can
speak of a systemic intrinsic value, corresponding to systemic moral consider-
ability, which designates the moral value of the larger system that the moral
agent is a part of. Moreover, this systemic aspect transfers to the consideration
for other individuals, whether they themselves are moral agents or not, so that
every individualistic intrinsic value is connected with a systemic intrinsic
value.63 The moral value of the other entails the moral value of the larger
system that the other is a part of. The systemic values connected to the perspec-
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65 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
tives of different individuals in the same ecological community are—to some
degree—different aspects of a common systemic intrinsic value. We may
therefore speak more loosely of the intrinsic value (meaning: moral
considerability) of nature or natural processes when there is little need or
possibility for distinguishing between the individual and systemic aspects of
intrinsic value.
VIII. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE FURTHER
IMPLICATIONS OF A SYSTEMIC ETHIC
The systemic ethic enables us to understand and analyze sustainability and
precaution as moral concepts on equal terms with the traditional moral
concepts of humanist, individualistic ethics. It provides a tool for structuring
and criticizing the different meanings of new normative concepts of environ-
mental concern. And it provides those new norms that are in agreement with the
systemic ethic, with a stronger moral basis that can give them more credence
and influence. In particular, the systemic ethic points to reflexive precaution
and functional integrity as more general understandings of precaution and
sustainability that include rational precaution and resource sufficiency as
means of dealing with known consequences and impacts.64 Furthermore, the
systemic ethic provides options for analyzing and criticizing traditional ethical
concepts from a new perspective. For example, by way of including the
unknown consequences of human action as important moral grounds of action,
the systemic ethic directs attention to our means of knowing consequences and
impacts, as well as to the influence of context on knowledge. In this way, the
systemic ethic provides a basis for criticizing rationalistic moral theories. And
bringing together systemic (or communitarian) ethics and individualistic ethics
in a common framework presents a different basis for discussion than that of
opposing theories.
In view of the systemic ethic, the concern for our future self and future generations
can be seen as an aspect of systemic moral considerability, which is quite
different from the individualistic approach to sustainability that is hampered
with theoretical problems.65 In the systemic perspective, the question of “our
future selves” involves an extension of the self as an object—an extension of
“me.” Our concern for the future of our children can be seen as a concern for
a slightly wider conception of “me.” This perspective provides reason for a further
concern for future generations—or future socioecological systems—on grounds of
it being in this sense our own future:  the ecological community of our grandchildren
will be a descendant of the societies and ecosystems of today.
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